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2021 APR 16 11:00 AM
KING COUNTY
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CASE #: 20-2-10245-8 SEA

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR KING COUNTY

KING COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Washington,

Petitioner,

v.

FRIENDS OF SAMMAMISH VALLEY,
a Washington nonprofit corporation, A
Farm in the Sammamish Valley LLC,
Marshall Leroy d/b/a Alki Market
Garden, Eunomia Farms LLC, Olympic
Nursery Inc., C-T Corp., Roots of Our
Times Cooperative, Regeneration Farm
LLC, Hollywood Hill Association, Terry
and David R. Orkiolla, Judith Allen, and
FUTUREWISE,

Respondents.

No. 20-2-10245-8 SEA

ORDER GRANTING KING
COUNTY'S APPEAL FROM AN
ORDER OF THE CENTRAL PUGET
SOUND REGION GROWTH
MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD

The Court considered the following:

1. King County's Opening Brief and appendices.
2. Responsive Brief of Friends Of Sammamish Valley, A Farm In The
Sammamish Valley LLC, Marshall Leroy D/B/A Alki Market Garden, Eunomia Farms
LLC, Olympic Nursery Inc., C-T Corp., Roots Of Our Times Cooperative, Regeneration

1 Farm LLC, Hollywood Hill Association, Terry and David R. Orkiolla, and Judith Allen
2 and appendices.

3 3. Futurewise's Responsive Brief and Appendices.

4 4. Petitioner King County's Consolidated Reply Brief on APA Appeal and
5 Appendices.

6 5. The Growth Management Hearings Board record, particularly the portions
7 drawn to the Court's attention by the parties.

8 6. The arguments of the parties at oral argument.

9
10
11 **1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

12 On May 18, 2019, the King County SEPA Responsible Official issued a
13 determination of nonsignificance (DNS) concerning Proposed Ordinance 2018-0241.2 –
14 Regulations for Wineries, Breweries and Distilleries (later designated as Ordinance
15 19030). Almost 7 months later, on December 4, 2019, the Metropolitan King County
16 Council adopted King County Ordinance 19030 (the Ordinance) amending specific King
17 County (the County) development regulations. The Ordinance was deemed adopted
18 without the Executive's signature on December 19, 2021.

19
20 The Friends of the Sammamish Valley (the FOSV), Futurewise and the other
21 named Respondents herein (the Petitioners), petitioned the Central Puget Sound Region
22 Growth Management Hearings Board (the Board), challenging Ordinance 19030. The case
23 was captioned *FOSV, et al. v. King County*, Case No. 20-3-0004c.
24
25

1 On May 26, 2020, the Board issued its Order on Dispositive Motions, finding that
2 Ordinance 19030 violated the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) and substantially
3 interfered with the fulfillment of Growth Management Act (GMA) Planning Goals 8 and
4 10 and, therefore, made a determination of invalidity regarding the Ordinance pursuant to
5 RCW 36.70A.302. The County timely appealed that decision.
6

7 2. THE BATTLE OF THE BURDENS

8 Courts review orders of the Board under the authority of the Administrative
9 Procedure Act (APA). RCW 34.05.570. See also, RCW 36.70A.300(5). “An appeal from
10 an administrative tribunal invokes the appellate, rather than the general, jurisdiction of the
11 superior court.” Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135
12 Wash.2d 542, 555 (1998).
13

14 The GMA seeks to provide a statewide framework for Washington State goals and
15 requirements. Spokane County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings
16 Board, 173 Wn.App. 310, 324 (2013). Succinctly stated, under the GMA, the Board must
17 grant deference to the County in the way the County plans for growth. The formulation of
18 that deference is complex, but its overall structure is found in a recent Division I opinion:
19

20 Under the GMA, comprehensive plans and development regulations are
21 presumed valid when adopted, and thus the Board must grant deference to counties
22 and cities in how they plan for growth, consistent with the requirements and goals
23 of the GMA. But deference to counties remains bounded by the goals and
24 requirements of the GMA. Therefore, the Board shall find compliance unless it
25 determines that a county action is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record
before the board and in light of the goals and requirements of the GMA.
To find an action clearly erroneous, the Board must have a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been committed. A board's ruling that fails to apply
this more deferential standard of review to a county's action is not entitled to
deference from an appellate court.

1 Heritage Baptist Church v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board,
2 2 Wash.App.2d 737, 746-747 (2018). (Citations, some punctuation and quotation marks,
3 omitted.) The “burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party
4 asserting invalidity.” RCW 34.05.570(1)(a). Here, therefore, the County bears the burden
5 of demonstrating the invalidity of the Board’s decisions. But as further highlighted by
6 Division I:
7

8 Deference to county planning actions, that are consistent with the goals and
9 requirements of the GMA, supersedes deference granted by the APA and courts to
10 administrative bodies in general. But this deference ends when it is shown that a
11 county's action are (sic) in fact a clearly erroneous application of the GMA.

12 Heritage Baptist Church, Supra, at 748. (Citations, some punctuation and quotation marks,
13 omitted.)

14 The Spokane County court further stated that while the legislature has dictated the
15 framework in the GMA, the act nonetheless “contains numerous provisions which tend to
16 show that local jurisdictions have broad discretion in adapting the requirements of the
17 GMA to local realities.” Supra, at 324; quoting Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound
18 Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash.2d 224, 236 (2005). The broad discretion given to
19 local jurisdictions is stated clearly in RCW 36.70A.320(1) and (3):
20

21 ...comprehensive plans and development regulations, and amendments
22 thereto, adopted under this chapter are presumed valid upon adoption....The board
23 shall find compliance unless it determines that the action by the state agency,
24 county, or city is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record before the board
25 and in light of the goals and requirements of this chapter.

RCW 36.70A.320(1), (3).

1 These standards articulate the competing power of local governments and the
2 Board. The adaptation of the GMA to local realities, therefore, is achieved through “a
3 unique standard of review that requires that the growth board defer to the decisions of
4 local governments on matters governed by the GMA, except where the local government
5 has clearly erred.” Spokane County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings
6 Board, *Supra*, at 321. The provisions granting local governments broad discretion:
7

8 ...include imposing a presumption that comprehensive plans and
9 development regulations are valid upon adoption, requiring a challenger of county
10 action under the GMA to carry the burden of demonstrating that the action is not in
11 compliance with the act, and requiring that the growth board broadly defer to local
12 planning determinations and find compliance with the GMA unless it determines
13 that an action is “ ‘clearly erroneous in view of the entire record before the board
14 and in light of the goals and requirements of [chapter 36.70A RCW].’

15 Spokane County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board, 173
16 Wn.App. 310, 325-326 (2013); RCW 36.70A.320(1)-(2).

17 SEPA Threshold Decisions are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
18 Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass'n v. King Cty. Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 274 (1976). A
19 finding is “clearly erroneous” when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
20 court on the record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
21 committed. *Id.*, at 274. Pursuant to RCW 43.21C.090, “(i)n any action involving an attack
22 on a determination by a governmental agency relative to the requirement or the absence of
23 the requirement, or the adequacy of a "detailed statement", the decision of the
24 governmental agency shall be accorded substantial weight.” RCW 43.21C.090. See also,
25 Anderson v. Pierce County, 86 Wn.App. 290, 302 (1997). Nonetheless, pursuant to RCW
43.21C.030(2)(c):

1 The agency's threshold determination is entitled to judicial deference, but
2 the agency must make a showing that “environmental factors were considered in a
3 manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance with the procedural
4 requirements of SEPA.”

5 Chuckanut Conservancy v. Washington State Dept. of Natural Resources,
6 156 Wash.App. 274, 286-287 (2010); quoting Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v.
7 City of Kirkland, 9 Wash.App. 59, 73 (1973). Prima facie compliance with the procedural
8 requirements of SEPA means the County must show that it considered environmental
9 factors in making that decision:

10 Thus, SEPA requires that a decision Not to prepare an Environmental
11 Impact Statement must be based upon a determination that the proposed project is
12 Not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment.

13 Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash.App. 59, 73 (1973).
14 (Emphasis in original.) See also, RCW 43.21C.030(c). The question is not whether the
15 major action will have a significant impact on the quality of the environment, but whether
16 the major action will have a probable significant impact:

17 An environmental impact statement ... shall be prepared on proposals for
18 legislation and other major actions having a *probable* significant, adverse
19 environmental impact....

20 An environmental impact statement is required to analyze only those
21 *probable* adverse environmental impacts which are significant. Beneficial
22 environmental impacts may be discussed.

23 RCW 43.21C.031(1) and (2). (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the County was required to
24 complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) if the action it was taking was a major
25 action that would have probable significant, adverse environmental impacts. *Id.*

1 developed by the city, county, or state in taking the action that is the subject of review by
2 the board....” WAC 242-03-565. Therefore, the Board’s own rules allow hearsay
3 evidence:

4 All relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, is admissible if, in the
5 opinion of the presiding officer, the offered evidence is the kind of evidence upon
6 which reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their
7 affairs. The presiding officer shall exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial,
8 or unduly repetitious.

9 WAC 242-03-620(1). In comparison, the rules relating to summary judgments in superior
10 courts limit the admission of evidence to affidavits made on personal knowledge which set
11 forth only such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the
12 affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated. CR 56(e).

13 In summary, the following rules apply when the Board entertains motions for
14 summary judgment:

- 15 • Hearsay evidence is generally allowed.
- 16 • Summary judgment motions are heard only when:
 - 17 1. The record before the Board is a limited record;
 - 18 2. The record does not involve disputed facts; and
 - 19 3. The matter before the Board consists of issues that turn primarily on
20 questions of law, such as the determination of the board's jurisdiction; the
21 standing of a petitioner, the timeliness of a petition, or the failure to act by a
22 statutory deadline.

23 Thus, in a motion for summary judgment before the Board concerning an action by
24 the County, the County is necessarily afforded deference in two ways.

- 25 1. The Board must find compliance unless it determines that the action by the
County is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record before the Board
and in light of the goals and requirements of the GMA. RCW
36.70A.320(3).

1 2. A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when the moving
2 party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that,
3 construing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
4 nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
5 law. CR 56.

6 **4. SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE THE BOARD**

7 **A Limited Record.**

8 As previously noted, the rules applicable to dispositive motions heard by the Board
9 limit those motions to the determination of the board's jurisdiction, the standing of a
10 petitioner, the timeliness of a petition, or the failure to act by a statutory deadline. WAC
11 242-03-555(1). In conformance with WAC 242-03-555(1), therefore, it is likely that such
12 motions would have a limited record.

13 In this matter, however, the 252 page record consists of a compilation of County
14 reports and recommendations and comments made by, for the most part, opponents of the
15 Ordinance. It is difficult to conceive of this record as a "limited record." Moreover, while
16 the Board did allow hearsay evidence (the record fails to show that any evidence was
17 disallowed), consideration of hearsay evidence when that evidence is a large part of the
18 record is problematic and points to the basis for the rule that the record in summary
19 judgment motions be limited.
20

21 **A Record that does not Involve Disputed Facts and Issues that turn Primarily** 22 **on Questions of Law.**

23 These two factors are closely related and will be discussed together. These factors
24 constitute the heart of the disagreement between the Petitioners and the County.
25

1 Despite the voluminous record before the Board, the Board concluded that there
2 were no disputed facts when it determined that the SEPA Checklist was not prepared in a
3 timely manner and that the Checklist was inadequate and inaccurate. CR 008539, Order
4 on Dispositive Motions, Page 5. The Board’s conclusions are discussed below.

5
6 **The Board’s Ability to Consider a Motion for Summary Judgment.**

7 The County argues that the Board’s own rules preclude the Board from hearing a
8 motion for summary judgment in this matter. This issue, however, despite the County’s
9 argument otherwise, was not raised before the Board concerning the Petitioner’s motion
10 for summary judgment and, therefore, may not be raised on appeal. RCW 34.05.554.

11 **Timing of the SEPA Checklist.**

12 The timing of a threshold determination (SEPA Checklist) is controlled by WAC
13 197-11-055. The “clock” for SEPA compliance may only potentially begin to tick when a
14 proposal exists. Pursuant to WAC 197-11-055(2)(a), a “proposal exists when an agency
15 ... has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative
16 means of accomplishing that goal and the environmental effects can be meaningfully
17 evaluated.” WAC 197-11-055(2)(a). (Emphasis in original.) Once an agency has a goal, is
18 actively preparing to make a decision and when the environmental effects of the proposal
19 can be meaningfully evaluated, the agency must prepare a Checklist “at the earliest
20 possible point in the planning and decision-making process, when the principal features of
21 a proposal and its environmental impacts can be reasonably identified.” WAC 197-11-
22 055(2).
23
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1 Under the facts presented to the Board, the County was not actively preparing to
2 make a decision until the spring of 2019 when a draft was passed out of a subcommittee of
3 the King County Council and the matter was forwarded to the full council for
4 consideration. The Board implied that the County was actively preparing to make a
5 decision two and a half years before it did when the Board stated that the County began to
6 consider the proposal “two and a half years before the threshold determination was made,”
7 and the Board appears to state that the environmental aspects of the proposal should have
8 been considered at that time. CR 008542, Order on Dispositive Motions, Page 8. The
9 Board also concluded that the Checklist “unambiguously anticipated that an EIS would
10 not be prepared. Id. Neither of these conclusions, however, are supported in the record.
11

12 Not only do the Board’s conclusions not recognize the reality of the action taken
13 by the King County Council, the Board’s conclusion as to the appropriate timing of a
14 SEPA Checklist does not comport with WAC 197-11-055 (discussed above).
15

16 If the County had taken an action earlier in the process, which would have pushed
17 the County in a particular direction, then arguably the SEPA threshold determination
18 should have been made at an earlier date. For instance, in King County v. Washington
19 State Boundary Review Bd. for King County, 122 Wash.2d 648 (1993), the court found
20 that a SEPA threshold decision was appropriate when an annexation action was taken. A
21 SEPA threshold delay until future development was proposed would not have been
22 appropriate because the annexation itself would invite future development. The King
23 County court stated that “an EIS is required if, based on the totality of the circumstances,
24 future development is probable following the action and if that development will have a
25

1 significant adverse effect upon the environment.” Id., at 655-657. Here, however, no
2 action was taken until the County adopted the Ordinance. Therefore, the SEPA Checklist
3 was timely completed prior to an action.

4 Moreover, there are sufficient material factual disputes relating to the timing of the
5 SEPA checklist to find that the Board, when all of the facts are viewed in a light most
6 favorable to the County (especially in light of RCW 43.21C.090, requiring the board to
7 accord "the decision of the governmental agency ... substantial weight), to find that the
8 Board erroneously interpreted or applied the law regarding the timing of the SEPA
9 Checklist.
10 Checklist.

11 **Legal Sufficiency of the SEPA Checklist.**

12 The County argues that, while the Ordinance will amend an existing zoning code,
13 those amendments will not result in probable significant, adverse environmental impacts.
14 Conversely, the Petitioners claim that the amendments will necessarily result in greater
15 development, or in the very least, allow the continuance of nonconforming uses. Facts
16 which might support either conclusion are found in the record presented to the Board.
17

18 The Board concluded, however, apparently as a matter of law, that the Ordinance
19 was a major action that would have probable significant, adverse environmental impacts.
20 The Board stated that “(i)t simply does not follow that removal of regulatory bans on
21 previously illegal activities will not result in an expansion of these newly-allowable
22 uses....” CR 008544, Order on Dispositive Motions, Page 10. The Board does not cite to
23 any specific evidence in the record for this conclusion. It appears that the conclusion,
24 therefore, arose from the Board’s reading of the Ordinance and the Board’s decision as to
25

1 it's likely affect. The County asserts, and there is evidence in the record which supports
2 their assertion, that County enforcement actions do not necessarily result in compliance.
3 (See Petitioner King County's Consolidated Reply Brief on APA Appeal, Pages 7-9.) The
4 County also argued before the Board that the amendments contained in the Ordinance
5 would make only minor changes to the code relative to the current baseline. (See
6 Petitioner King County's Consolidated Reply Brief on APA Appeal, Pages 5-6.) While
7 many of those who wrote in opposition to the County's determination to issue a DNS had
8 the expertise to express their opinions concerning the likely effect of the Ordinance, the
9 County also presented the opinions of individuals who qualified as experts, and these
10 individuals reached the opposite conclusion. For instance, Ty Peterson, the King County
11 SEPA Responsible Official, stated that he had 25 years of experience in that role. He
12 opined that relatively minor amendments associated with the Ordinance made it
13 impossible to determine that the Ordinance would result in probable significant, adverse
14 environmental impacts. CR 008509-008510, Ty Peterson, Memorandum, Page 1-2. While
15 Mr. Peterson may be incorrect, so may the experts who wrote letters in opposition to the
16 County regarding the decision to issue a DNS. Further, the County argues that evidence in
17 the SEPA Environmental Checklist, the King County Sammamish Valley Wine and
18 Beverage Study and the King County Action Report supports their position.
19
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22 The Board also appears to have concluded that the County believed it was
23 somehow exempt from SEPA review because the Checklist stated several times in Section
24
25

1 B that many questions were “not applicable for this nonproject¹ action. The Board stated
2 that:

3 Nonproject actions are not exempt from adequate SEPA review and
4 jurisdictions may not evade adequate SEPA review by deferring analysis until later
5 stages of actual development when the principal features of a proposal and its
environmental impacts can be reasonably identified.

6 CR 008543, Order on Dispositive Motions, Page 9. But the instructions for the SEPA
7 Checklist state that “(t)he lead agency may exclude (for non-projects) questions in Part B
8 – Environmental Elements – that do not contribute meaningfully to the analysis of the
9 proposal.” CR 008485, SEPA Environmental Checklist, Page 1. The Checklist
10 instructions also state that the Supplemental Sheet for Nonproject Actions (Part D) should
11 be completed for nonproject actions. This supplemental sheet was completed by the
12 County SEPA Official and contains statements of fact indicating why the responsible
13 official determined that a DNS was appropriate. While these factual statements and the
14 County’s ultimate conclusion that a DNS was appropriate are subject to reasonable debate,
15 the SEPA Checklist submitted by the County was not a document which argued for a per
16 se exemption from environmental review.
17
18

19 The Board also stated that the County failed to specifically contest any of the
20 factual allegations of Petitioners. CR 008539, Order on Dispositive Motions, Page 5. Yet,
21 the County’s Response to Petitioners’ Dispositive SEPA Motions took issue with the
22 Petitioners’ factual assertions and also highlighted their own factual assertions. CR
23

24 ¹ “Nonproject actions involve decisions on policies, plans, or programs,” including “[t]he adoption or
25 amendment of comprehensive land use plans or zoning ordinances.” WAC 197-11-704(2)(b)(ii); see also
WAC 197-11-774.

1 008401-008404, King County's Response to Petitioners' Dispositive SEPA Motions,
2 Pages 12-15.

3 As previously noted, the Board was required to deny Petitioners' motion for
4 summary judgment unless the Petitioners were able to show that there was no genuine
5 dispute as to any material fact and that, construing the facts and inferences in the light
6 most favorable to the County, the Petitioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
7 This did not occur. In addition to the disputed material facts, the questions before the
8 Board were complex and not conducive to a summary judgment motion. The Board's own
9 rules recognize the need for a full hearing when presented with the record and issues
10 presented by this case. WAC 242-03-555(1). Moreover, WAC 242-03-610(1) also states
11 that:
12

13
14 The purpose of any hearing is for the parties to present oral argument based
15 on the record as presented in their briefs and exhibits and for the board to ask
questions necessary for a thorough understanding of the issues for decision.

16 WAC 242-03-610(1). The Board erroneously interpreted or applied the law regarding the
17 legal sufficiency of the SEPA Checklist.

18 These matters must be remanded to the Board for a full hearing pursuant to WAC
19 242-03-610(1).
20

21 3. DEMONSTRATION PROJECT A

22 The County asserts that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Demonstration Project
23 Overlay A (Project A) because Project A is not a permanent amendment. The County
24 states that, pursuant to RCW 36.70A.290(2), only permanent amendments are subject to
25

1 the Board's jurisdiction. But the section of RCW 36.70A.290 cited by the County merely
2 states that:

3 All petitions relating to whether or not an adopted comprehensive plan,
4 development regulation, or permanent amendment thereto, is in compliance with
5 the goals and requirements of this chapter or chapter 90.58 or 43.21C RCW must
6 be filed within sixty days after publication as provided in (a) through (c) of this
7 subsection.

8 RCW 36.70A.290(2). (Emphasis supplied.) The language cited clearly relates to the
9 timing of the filing of a petition. The County argues that the highlighted language in some
10 way limits the Board's jurisdiction. This statutory language, however, should be read only
11 to relate to the issue specified in the statute: the timing of the filing of a petition. The
12 Board had the jurisdiction to consider Project A.

13 4. FINDING AA

14 Section 1., Finding AA of the Ordinance, notes that some businesses may take
15 several months to come into compliance with the Ordinance, and that:

17 For businesses progressing toward compliance with the ordinance, the
18 county does not intend to begin enforcement proceedings for a minimum of twelve
19 months after the effective date of this ordinance.

20 CR 007763, Ordinance 19030, Page 14. The County argues that the Board erred when it
21 denied the County's motion for summary judgment requesting the Board rule that the
22 Board lacked jurisdiction over Finding AA. The County argues that Finding AA is not a
23 development regulation and is, instead, a site-specific land use decision which, therefore,
24 deprives the Board of jurisdiction pursuant to RCW 36.70A.280 and RCW 36.70C.030(1).
25

1 The County apparently argues in the alternative that Finding AA simply allows the
2 executive to use the executive's discretion regarding enforcement of the Ordinance.

3 FOSV argues that, pursuant to RCW 36.70A.030(8), Finding AA is properly
4 defined as a development regulation. This statute states in part:
5

6 "Development regulations" or "regulation" means the controls placed on
7 development or land use activities by a county or city, including, but not limited
8 to, zoning ordinances, critical areas ordinances, shoreline master programs, official
9 controls, planned unit development ordinances, subdivision ordinances, and
10 binding site plan ordinances together with any amendments thereto.

11 RCW 36.70A.030(8). The language at issue in Finding AA states "the county does not
12 intend to begin enforcement proceedings for a minimum of twelve months after the
13 effective date of this ordinance." CR 007763, Ordinance 19030, Page 14. (Emphasis
14 supplied.) When the County adopted Finding AA, it effectively amended a development
15 regulation for a minimum of twelve months. While the amendment may have a life span
16 of twelve months (or longer), it is nonetheless, a development regulation during that
17 period of time.

18 **ORDER**

19 The Board's Order on Dispositive Motions in *FOSV, et al. v. King County*, Growth
20 Management Hearings Board Case No. 20-3-0004c (May 26, 2020) is REVERSED and
21 REMANDED. The Board's Order on Dispositive Motions exceeded its statutory
22 authority, and was based on an improper application of the CR 56 standard.

23 The County's motions for summary judgment concerning Project A and Finding
24 AA are denied.
25

King County Superior Court
Judicial Electronic Signature Page

Case Number: 20-2-10245-8
Case Title: KING COUNTY vs FRIENDS OF SAMMAMISH VALLEY ET AL
Document Title: ORDER RE ON APPEAL
Signed By: David Steiner
Date: April 16, 2021



Judge: David Steiner

This document is signed in accordance with the provisions in GR 30.

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O=KCDJA, CN="David Steiner:
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